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ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT COLLECTING SOCIETIES AND
DIGITAL RIGHTS: IS THERE A CASE FOR A CENTRALISED
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT EXCHANGE?
RUTH TOWSE
Abstract. Copyright collecting societies have attracted economists’ at-
tention for over 30 years and the attention of government regulators for
even longer. They have typically been accepted by economists and by
courts of law as necessary for reducing transaction costs and enabling
copyright to work. The advent of digitization has led to renewed inter-
est in the topic and to the view that though new technologies oﬀer the
possibility of improved rights management, collecting societies are not
responding suﬃciently to these opportunities. That view was evident in
recent enquiries into the role of copyright in the digital age in the UK,
which proposed the formation of a Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE)
that would promote online digital trade. This paper evaluates the case
for the DCE in the light of what economists know about collective rights
management.
1. Introduction
In a recent article in this journal, Nancy Gallini (2011) oﬀered new insights
into the economics of copyright collecting societies by comparing them to
patent pools. She concluded that the case for collecting societies as trans-
action cost minimising natural monopolies was still sound. However, she
suggested that her conclusion might be changed by the spread of digital
rights in copyright works and that is what I consider in this paper. She
argued that if new technologies lower the costs of licensing, monitoring and
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enforcement, there would be a tendency to more decentralised alternatives
to collective administration.
In this paper, I take up the discussion in the context of the proposal
that the UK government encourage the formation of a Digital Copyright
Exchange (DCE), a centralised clearing house for digital management of
rights. The proposal was first put forward in the Hargreaves Review (2010)
on two grounds: one, that a central exchange could more eﬃciently handle
cross media (and possibly cross national) licensing of digital rights of all
types of works than is the case in the current situation in which a multiplic-
ity of collecting societies manage a restricted bundles of works in particular
media, making it necessary for multimedia firms, such as broadcasters, to
obtain licences from several societies. The second ground was that the DCE
could introduce competition into the ‘locked-in’ system of collecting soci-
eties, each with its specific bundle of rights, territories and administrative
procedures, which are held to be anti-competitive, lacking transparency and
ineﬃcient and, more to the point for this paper, unable to handle the needs
of new digital platforms. The proposal has now been followed up by the
Hooper study on the feasibility of the DCE, which reported in two phases:
Rights and Wrongs (2012a) and Copyright Works (2012b); in the latter the
DCE morphed into the notion of a Copyright Hub incorporating a number
of DCEs. These moves to centralize licensing, however, gainsay Gallini’s
conclusion that new technologies could lead to greater decentralization.
The present paper uses the DCE proposal as the backdrop for discussing
three basic questions it seems to me economists should ask in this context:
has digitization fundamentally altered the economic case for collective rights
management? Second, would a new system of licensing alter the accepted
view of collecting societies as natural monopolies? Third, can eﬀective com-
petition or contestability be introduced by a centralised copyright exchange
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216165
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into the world of collecting societies so as to reduce transaction costs, as
envisaged in the UK reports?
2. The DCE proposal
The DCE is conceived as an online electronic system that ‘allows licensors
to oﬀer their rights and licensees/rights users to license them’. Registration
has to be voluntary because copyright/authors’ rights are viewed by the
Berne Convention as automatic and copyright owners cannot be required to
register. The DCE would have several functions for users: it would reduce
search costs of content and rights holders across diﬀerent media and enable
transactions to take place electronically while providing rights holders with
a full account of usage and royalties due (Hooper, 2012b). Digital methods
are seen as facilitating ‘knowing exactly’ what uses are being made of works
and so enable rights owners to be ‘correctly’ paid for their contribution.
There is the suggestion that it would enable individual licensing though it
is clear that the DCE needs to work with the collecting societies who hold
significant databases. The proposal is based on the view that copyright
licensing can be improved by digital rights management (DRM) and that
digital rights and digital trade are somehow diﬀerent.
A main focus of the proposed DCE is that the cost of obtaining the use
of rights is ‘expensive’ and ‘high’ but there is little attempt to meaning-
fully define ‘expensive’. The Hargreaves Review suggested that they are
high because there is insuﬃcient competition in licensing services provided
by the collecting societies. What is not considered at all is that if users
are prepared to pay ‘expensive’ prices, the market would be economically
eﬃcient. The question that should be asked is: are the administrative costs
of copyright licensing unnecessarily high and if so, why? A report by KEA
(2012) provides ample evidence on the sources of transaction costs in music
licensing (see below).
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There is, however, a wider context to the UK proposal: the EU has been
concerned for some time about the single market aspects of copyright li-
censing: though there is a common market for the use of copyright works,
licensing is nationally based. There are in eﬀect three issues in one — the
impact of digitization, cross-border licensing and the governance and man-
agement of copyright collecting societies; they interact because it is held that
some (many?) of the European collecting societies have not responded to
the need for digital licensing nor are their accounting methods transparent
or capable of being influenced by ‘foreign’ rights holders, such as composers
whose music is being played throughout the EU but with licences issued each
territory, possibly on diﬀering terms. There is also concern about the power
of collecting societies to hold-up legal access to digital copyright works thus
exacerbating unauthorized use. These concerns were aired by Hargreaves
and Hooper and also in EC (2012) — a proposed European Directive on
multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses.
3. Digital rights, digital products and digital services
3.1. Digital rights. With the emphasis in these reports on digital trade it
is worth considering what is meant by digital rights since the term seems to
be used to mean several things: there are rights to works that were created
digitally or were digitized from analogue form and there are digital rights
that attach to copyright works in tangible form (such as a book); there is
digital rights management that could mean digital management of rights
by electronic means (DRM) using technological protection measures (TPM)
or management of digital rights, which could be done using ‘analogue’ age
methods by existing collective licensing systems. Forms of DRM are used in
various ways by collecting societies and by the producers of creative prod-
ucts, though the cherished ideal of technology solving all monitoring and
enforcement problems has not been realised and firms that used them, for
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instance record labels, have had to abandon some types of DRM for both
legal reasons and its unpopularity with consumers; moreover standards do
not yet exist for use on all platforms. Thus we need to distinguish the man-
agement of digital rights from the use of DRM as a management tool in
collecting societies in order to ask if the nature of digital services and their
markets calls for a new structure of rights management.
Electronic distribution of digital products has led to the introduction of
new ‘digital’ rights into copyright law and its adaptation to new technologies.
The right to make a work available on demand and the right to consent to
electronic communication to the public were created to extend the existing
bundle of copyright protection to internet trade; as with other rights in
the copyright bundle, they may be licensed separately from other rights
in the same work. Copyright law has also extended protection for online
use to neighbouring rights for broadcasters, sound recording makers and
performers. Some of these extensions, especially those mandating statutory
licences, require remuneration to be administered by collecting societies,
leading to the creation of new societies and boosting the status and revenues
of older ones. Performers have been accorded individual rights in digital
works which they may or may not choose to enforce via a collecting society.
All in all therefore, copyright law has become more complex and broader in
scope as a result of digitization, as well as having longer duration.
3.2. The eﬀect of digitization on markets for copyright products.
One of the biggest shifts caused by digitization and trade in digital services
is that copyright products that were previously sold in tangible form for a
price — books, CDs, videos — are licensed as a service when in digital form
for a fee. Some features that apply to sales of goods do not extend to li-
censed services; the first sale doctrine that allows resale, lending or sharing
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of a physical book or CD may not extend to the same book or CD in elec-
tronic form, depending upon national law. In tangible form, products that
contain a bundle of works will have had all rights cleared for sale to the con-
sumer but the same product in digital form involves further permissions and
transactions. As is well known, digitization has made products that were
rival and excludable into what are tantamount to public goods with only
observance of copyright law and TPMs as means of exclusion to discourage
(‘prevent’) free-riding. Diﬀerent business models have developed for licens-
ing rights than for outright sales. Two basic models used for the licence fee
are a subscription that covers a bundle of items for a period of time and a
per use model in which the user pays to use the item each time, say a book
title or music track; especially the latter requires users to renew the licence
frequently, increasing the number of transactions.
Two things follow from this: one, that far more licensing of products of
the creative industries is going on in the digital than in the analogue world;
second, revenues from licences now replace producers’ sales revenues wholly
or in part, depending on the product. Both these developments make the
ease and cost of licensing arrangements more significant. The growth of
digital products, growth of digital rights and growth of the number of trans-
actions has put the administration of copyright licensing in the spotlight
resulting in renewed interest in the pros and cons of collective licensing.
What is also the case, however, is that many copyright works are not in
digital form, indeed the vast majority of works in copyright are no longer
in publication since the copyright term by far exceeds the shelf life of the
products that contain copyright works. Products currently on the market
are not all digitized and even ones that are may well exist in both analogue
and digital form, say a book or newspaper. Digital rights are only part of
the whole bundle that needs clearance for use in those cases. Though little
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is known about the age structure of collecting societies’ portfolios, potential
users may prefer to obtain a licence for all rights in one transaction rather
than obtaining analogue and digital rights separately, which they may do
through collecting societies.
3.3. The impact of digitization on the administration of rights.
Digital rights combined with eﬀective DRM held out the promise of indi-
vidual licensing for digital services by digital means; that was the scenario
presented in Katz (2006/10). That scenario seemed at first sight to suggest
that a competitive market for administering digital rights would emerge
spontaneously, making collecting societies redundant or at least contestable.
It suggested that creators would be better able to contract directly with
users even to control secondary use. The DRM dream has faded but that
has not meant no change at collecting societies.
Collecting societies have utilised the internet and electronic means to
enable easy access to licensing arrangements making it trivially simple to
obtain a standard blanket licence for a defined set of uses. That requires the
user to know where to go for the licence, which however is easily searched
for online. But collecting societies do not put users in touch with copyright
holders. The chief merit of a Digital Copyright Exchange or Hub is that
it would act as a clearing house for information on all rights holders and
the agencies that license their rights across diﬀerent media and it may also
provide a gateway to contacting them; it would in eﬀect provide a club good.
Similar models already exist: for example, JSTOR supplies that service for
academic publications; it can be seen as a club good serving academia and
SSRN fulfils the role of a centralised information service. Club goods are
typically financed by membership subscriptions and there is an issue as to
how many members are admitted, for example to a tennis club, but the DCE
presents the opposite case as its value as a network subsists in supplying a
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comprehensive list, suggesting that there could be free-riding and hold-ups
by rights owners who do not wish to join or pay for the maintenance of the
service. The DCE could also operate as a platform for a two-sided market, fi-
nanced by users and rights holders who would pay for the information.1 Any
such payments would likely add to transaction costs, however. A potential
weakness of the DCE would be that if it does not have comprehensive infor-
mation, for example if rights holders do not wish to take part, it could leave
users with an even more diﬃcult task of searching to contact them. That is
also a problem with rights management by collecting societies identified in
by KEA (2012).
3.4. Digital services in music. The main thrust of a lot of the issues
discussed above has to do with music licensing for online use; that is no doubt
because setting up legal facilities is considered vital to the future of the sound
recording industry, which was in the forefront of the impact of digitization, as
well as to achieving greater respect for copyright law. The KEA (2012) study
looked in detail at basically two problems that have held up the development
of online music services in Europe, namely, the diﬃculties and expense of
multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licensing. Online music services have
been slow to develop and that is no surprise as it is estimated that a service
aiming to oﬀer over a million titles in several countries could face transaction
costs of up to 260,000 euros (KEA, 2012; 46). In this context, licensing costs
are ex ante costs of searching and negotiating a licence: the study did not
deal with ex post enforcement and other such costs. The costs are estimated
on the basis of the time and eﬀort needed for finding rights owners and
agreeing terms: for the figure just quoted, negotiations could take up to two
years. Even if (as is usual) these figures are to be treated with caution,
they indicate the extent of the problem that the DCE seeks to overcome.
1Thanks to Richard Watt for suggesting the two-sided market model. Further work on this subject
should certainly consider that in detail.
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The main problems identified are the multiplicity of rights that are owned
and/or managed by diﬀerent agents (which would have been aggregated
and cleared for the sale of a CD by the sound recording producer), the
absence of complete information on rights ownership (especially an issue
in sound recordings where there are multiple authors and performers), the
territorality of rights that make it necessary to deal with collecting societies
in all the territories in which the online service is to operate and above
all, the bargaining power of the major labels and publishers who control 75
per cent of the market, with whom negotiations are longer; in addition, they
demand advances to be paid, which is a disincentive to start-ups and smaller
online music service enterprises. Perhaps the problems with recorded music
are greater than for other creative content but multimedia services also are
held to face similar costs according to Hooper (2012b). Soundexchange in
the US, however, oﬀers an interesting contrast: it is a non-profit rights
management organisation approved by the Copyright Board for collecting
royalties from digital music services operating under statutory licences.2
To sum up this section: from the economic point of view, digitization has
led to digital rights on both new and older copyright works and to more
rentals and licensing; the volume of transactions and licensing has increased
and while online administration by collecting societies have reduced the
cost of obtaining the licences, new online music services face considerable
costs of negotiation and finding information. The case for the DCE is that
it improves that information. To evaluate its role beyond that function by
extending into licensing itself, though, and to discuss the merits of individual
versus collective licensing, we need to consider the economics of collecting
societies.
2http://www.soundexchange.com
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3.5. The economics of collecting societies. There is a small literature
on the economics of copyright collecting societies: Weir and Peacock (1975)
produced what seems to have been the first empirical study of collective
rights management - on the UK’s Performing Rights Society; the issue at
that time was how to set the rate in the bilateral monopoly between the
PRS and the BBC which was a monopsony user of recorded music and
a major supplier of live broadcast music. Hollander (1984) provided the
first analytical study, followed by Besen and Kirkby (1989) and Besen et al
(1992). The subject has been periodically revisited by economists with very
similar conclusions, namely, that collecting societies are natural monopolies
and that blanket licensing is generally eﬃcient.3 It is these conclusions that
digitization might change.
3.6. What makes collecting societies natural monopolies? Collect-
ing societies perform several functions as a bundled service: administering
rights for their members, licensing those rights to users, monitoring use and
enforcing copyright for their members’ works. This bundling is the basis of
economies of scale and scope for the collecting society. They supply joint
products for the rights holder and oﬀer a service to users of access via a bun-
dled licence to all works in the repertoire held by the national society and,
through agreements with comparable collecting societies in other territories,
they eﬀectively oﬀer a licence to world repertoire of the type of work they
administer (music, literature, etc). It costs very little to oﬀer these services
to additional members and works once the initial investment in the struc-
ture of licensing, fee setting and monitoring is in place - hence the natural
monopoly - and the cost of licensing to rights holders and users is thereby
vastly reduced.
3For a survey, see Handke and Towse (2007).
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In most cases, anyone with a published copyright work may join the ap-
propriate collecting society,4 whose portfolio is determined by the medium
and the scope of the rights, and in so doing he or she ‘registers’ their work(s)
with the title and the author’s name(s) and provides contact and bank de-
tails. That yields two databases: one of works and names of the rights
holders and one of rights holders’ details for the distribution of royalties
and other payments, both of which the rights holders themselves have the
incentive to keep up to date.5 It is worth noting that the cost of registering
works is largely borne by the rights holders not the society as once the tem-
plate for the required information is on the society’s website, registration is
done by the rights holder online and that can be time consuming even for a
small rights owner as detailed information must be provided. The collecting
society has a third database of licensees and some details about them, such
as the type of user and extent of their use since that determines the rate for
the licence, and it incurs costs of maintaining that database and adminis-
tering licences; online licensing has simplified these processes, however. The
terms of the licence in some cases require the licensee to provide information
about the use made of individual works, such as a song title, which adds
compliance costs to the licence fee for users.
Since the fixed costs of setting up these databases can be spread over
very large numbers of works and rights holders and the bundled services are
oﬀered collectively, collective licensing has falling average costs and low mar-
ginal costs. Existing members benefit from enlarging membership as the size
of the repertoire oﬀered increases. Though there are probably no economies
of scale in creating each of the collecting societies’ databases of copyright
4In some jurisdictions, open membership to qualifying creators is mandatory. This would be called
‘common carriage’ in other contexts.
5That is not always the case for heirs and indeed, one weakness of copyright is that heirs do not
always know they own rights or perceive them to be of value. Many ‘orphan’ works belong to
unknowing owners. The problem libraries and archives have in dealing with digitizing orphan
works is expected to be in part solved by the DCE.
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holders and works in the first place, replicating them would be ineﬃcient;
collective licensing is a network with similar characteristics to networks such
as gas pipes and rail track. As with those utilities, a regulatory authority
could enforce ‘open access’ to encourage competition but without it, dupli-
cation of the database information would increase administrative and other
transaction costs for rights holders and the cost of setting up the databases
would put new entrants to the business of managing licensing at a disad-
vantage. Of course the databases could easily be copied but the collecting
society would have no incentive to allow that as they are its commercial
assets and it knows that doing so would invite competition.6 It is likely for
this reason that the Hargreaves Review suggested the DCE should cooper-
ate with the collecting societies. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, collecting
societies are regulated by the state and the government could enforce open
access and common carriage rules.7
In addition to being natural monopolies in the economic sense, collect-
ing societies also acquire monopoly control of the rights they manage since
they require the exclusive assignment of a specific bundle of rights as a
condition of membership, thereby enabling them to oﬀer a blanket licence.
This requirement typically rules out individual licensing and the opportu-
nity that gives for negotiating licences for particular uses (Hollander, 1984;
Katz, 2006/10) and the blanket licence also rules out rewarding the owners
of works exactly for the use made of their works, a topic that is discussed
below.
6British Equity Collecting Society that licenses performers’ rights has licensed access to some of
the information held on its database to assist producers of new programmes with completing cast
lists for new productions. ‘This ensures that existing data being reused where possible rather than
data being retyped, possibly with minor errors, which in turn create rights verification issues for
the future.’ BECS evidence to the Hargreaves Review (p.18).
7In the UK, however, there is minimal regulation via the Copyright Tribunal, which deals with
conflict resolution for disputes over commercial licensing.
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3.7. Blanket and individual licensing. Economies of scale and scope
particularly come into play with the blanket licence that is the standard
practice of collecting societies. The main economic argument for blanket li-
censing is that it reduces transaction costs to both rights holders and users.
Blanket licences are typically negotiated with representative user organisa-
tions, for example, of broadcasters, discotheques and shops and rates set
accordingly. Collecting societies’ monopoly of licensing services for the bun-
dles of rights they manage gives them power over pricing that is a cause for
concern but it is also the case those organisations have some countervail-
ing power, especially the big broadcasters.8 Price discrimination in licence
fees is common. There are economies of scale in the transaction costs of
negotiating and agreeing terms between the collecting society and the trade
organisation which then enables individual businesses to easily obtain a li-
cence. These transaction costs are considered to be too great for any but the
wealthiest individual rights holder and may be prohibitive even for them.
The blanket licence does not fully ensure that every available work is
licensed for all uses that the collecting society covers at home and through
its foreign partners. A point that is not often mentioned is that since not
every rights holder wants to join a collecting society, collecting societies do
not have the mandate to licence all works of a particular type. According
to Katz (2005), however, the purchase of a licence from the appropriate
collecting society is deemed by courts to be a defence against unauthorised
use and so oﬀers peace of mind to users. If licences are oﬀered individually,
there is a greater risk to users of not having that permission.
Collecting societies everywhere (except the US where there is a duopoly
in music licensing) are monopoly providers of licensing services and typi-
cally only oﬀer a blanket licence, seemingly ruling out individual licensing.
Though individual licensing is held out as more accurately rewarding the
8In the UK the BBC is still a leading broadcaster with considerable clout.
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owners of works for the use made of those works than does the blanket li-
cence, it would not necessarily increase the sum they command on the open
market. According to Katz (2005, 2006/10), there is no requirement for
collecting societies to oﬀer a blanket licence for all the works in the reper-
toire of members: they could debundle rights and works and license them
at discriminate prices. He points out that in principle collecting societies
can oﬀer a collectively determined price for individual works but that would
have to be lower than the fee for the blanket licence to make it attractive to
users; Liebowitz and Margolis (2009), however, disagree on the grounds de-
bundling would be ineﬃcient and Snow and Watt (2005) make the argument
in terms of the risk-bearing aspect of blanket licensing: debundling trans-
fers all risk to each member, thereby eliminating any benefits of risk sharing
that collecting societies could oﬀer (see later). Moreover, not all users want
blanket permission: every user may not wish to obtain permission and pay,
say, for copying articles from hundreds of newspapers; some business users
may just want to copy articles from a top few national dailies, for example.
Collecting societies have been unwilling or unable due to their articles of
governance to deal with reduced repertoire or individual licensing.
3.8. Setting the rate for licences. The blanket licence is a flat fee for the
whole range of works whose rights are owned by the membership. Though
there are diﬀerent rates for diﬀerent uses and users based on the potential
audience sizes or on users’ revenues, the licence fee does not discriminate in
pricing according to the quality, characteristics or popularity of members’
works. What determines a member’s royalty distribution is the volume and
type of usage.
Setting the rate itself involves considerable costs of negotiation with mul-
tiple users in a market environment. Even in the analogue world, new tech-
nologies developed new uses and rates had to be set for unknown future
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revenues. Especially where a copyright board or court is involved, that
seems to be done by analogy to a similar existing medium or platform, for
instance, treating digital replay devices like time shifting using a VHS de-
vice, and increments are set according to a rule of thumb, such as the rate
of inflation, rather than according to the market conditions for the type of
work. These rates then become accepted and path dependency sets in. This
also can happen in ‘free’ bargaining and that currently applies to online uses
because their value cannot be verified in advance; moreover, some ventures
would become prohibitively expensive if payments had to be made in ad-
vance but, on the other hand, if creators or performers have to wait for their
payments, they are eﬀectively involved in financing the undertaking without
any power of decision-making. It is widely accepted that ‘nobody knows’ in
launching new works in the creative industries but that equally applies to
new business models. There is also the risk that digital media and platforms
‘cannibalize’ existing products. Experience of the existing market may not
be a guide but in a radically uncertain world of new products, previous
experience of a similar market may be the best guide in setting the rate.
Individual licensing by the right owner herself would require exactly the
same process of bargaining, rate setting, collecting licence fees and so on
but the associated costs would be higher without the benefit of economies of
scale that blanket licensing aﬀords. A private agency could oﬀer the services
of rights administration, a move envisaged by Hargreaves (and also by Hol-
lander, 1984; Besen et al, 1992) and Hooper (2012b) reports the presence of
a number of private companies doing just that, but unless they are able to
achieve comparable economies of scale and scope to those of a collecting so-
ciety, their administration charges must be higher. For the user, the search
costs would also be higher but there may be other advantages, such as a
lower fee than a collecting society would oﬀer in a blanket licence. Having
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the DCE might encourage the development of such agencies by reducing the
search costs to users. If it were to be involved in rate-setting itself, these are
the issues it would also face. For the rights holder, the comparable service
from the DCE would also have to include monitoring all uses and enforcing
licences, vital and costly services that get no mention in the DCE proposal.
3.9. Distribution of revenues. The distribution of revenues by the col-
lecting society requires a database of rights holders’ contact details. Rev-
enues from the sale of blanket licences and other forms of remuneration are
distributed net of administration costs to every rights holder who earns more
than the minimum annual sum. The distribution takes the use of individ-
ual works into account by rather indirect means such as playlists and top
ten charts. Some societies have compensating preferential rates for distri-
butions to particular groups of members, for example, classical composers,
whose works do not figure in listings or in returns by large scale venues. This
lack of accuracy on the value of the individual’s work has been criticised on
the grounds that the financial incentive of copyright is blunted: that may be
but what needs to be recognised is that there is a trade-oﬀ between the costs
of more detailed monitoring of use and administrative costs to rights hold-
ers. In European societies, their articles often mandate deductions of ten
per cent or so for ‘cultural purposes’. In general, the lack of accountability
and transparency in the distributions of some of those collecting societies,
especially from cross-national licensing, is likely to be regulated within the
EU.9
Snow and Watt (2005), however, argue that by going to the lengths they
do to distribute revenue according to use made of individual members’ works,
collecting societies miss the opportunity to act as a risk-pooling insurance
9EC COM(2012) 372 final Proposal for a Directive on collective management of copyright and
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal
market.
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mutual. Though they bundle works together in the blanket licence for the li-
censing purposes, they then incur transaction costs in eﬀectively debundling
them for distribution purposes. They demonstrate that this is economically
ineﬃcient and propose an alternative model for distribution that both re-
wards the creators of successful works, thus providing an incentive to create
them, and distributes a share in the success of the whole repertoire of the
collecting society, thereby pooling risk in the highly uncertain markets for
copyright works. This combination is compatible with the basic assumptions
that collective rights management is preferable to individual licensing and
that the collecting society welcomes new members whose works will increase
revenues and therefore shares for all. Open membership is anyway mostly
required by regulators, probably for equity reasons and it is interesting that
Snow and Watt also find it to be economically eﬃcient.
3.10. Administrative costs. Much of the criticism of collecting societies
has been aimed at their administration costs, which vary quite a lot, the
lowest in the UK being around 8 per cent and the highest around 20 per
cent. That criticism featured prominently in both Hargreaves (2012) and
Hooper (2012a) for UK collecting societies, though in international terms
the figures are low.10 In fact, little eﬀort is made by either report to put
these costs into perspective; for example, the BBC’s frequently quoted shock-
horror L=10 million licensing costs for clearing rights of archive programmes
for its iPlayer needs to be set in the context of its nearly L=5 billion revenue;
the BBC is in the business of rights licensing and sales! Many societies in
other countries have higher charges, and those are passed on through the
system of international transfers that are made through agreements between
national societies, including to the UK which, at least for music, is a net
exporter. In fact, all businesses have transaction and administrative costs;
10Einhorn (2006) points out the ‘competition’ (a regulated duopoly) between ASCAP and BMI
in the US results in higher charges than those of the UK’s PRS for musical performing rights.
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for example, administrative expenses for insurers of small health plans in
the US constitute 25 to 27 per cent of premiums.11 That said, it is clear
from the research by KEA (2012) that transaction costs of music licensing
are suﬃciently high as to deter start-up online music services so that only
big players, such as iTunes, enter the market.
It is assumed in the Hargreaves and Hooper reports that DRM can consid-
erably reduce or avoid such administrative costs though there is no evidence
on this point. Nor are there any estimates of the costs associated with the
DCE; the ‘impact’ estimates of the (considerable) net benefits of the DCE
assume only benefits from it, no costs!12 The full cost would also have to
take into account switching costs, the costs of displacement of the existing
licensing system and any reduction to creators’ earnings.
4. Other arguments for blanket licensing
In addition to the transaction cost minimization rationale for blanket
licensing, other arguments have been advanced in favour of blanket licensing
and they also oﬀer a critique of individual licensing.
A variation on the transaction cost argument is presented by Parisi and
Depoorter (2003) who argue that if the works in the repertoire of the col-
lecting society are complementary, the blanket licence is eﬃcient because
it prevents the ‘tragedy of anti-commons pricing’, meaning that excessive
diversity of rights owners and works results in no trade being feasible due to
the high cost or impossibility of tracing owners. If the repertoire consists of
substitutes, though, blanket licensing simply reinforces the monopoly and
prevents competition. The case can be made either way, it seems: in one
sense all works within a genre are substitutes — several plays cannot be put
11Small Business Research Summary (ISSN 1076-8904) of the U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion’s Oﬃce of Advocacy.
12It is claimed that UK GDP would increase by £2.2bn due to the DCE (Hargreaves, 2012: Annexe
EE), a figure that was believed by only a tiny proportion of the few respondents who replied to
that point in the Hooper questionnaire (Hooper, 2012a:64)!
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on in one theatre simultaneously — but users wanting a broad repertoire of
works seem to view individual works as complements in a diverse service,
such as a radio programme. The point is how users behave when faced with
changes in relative prices for which, however, there need to be alternatives
to blanket licences. One situation in which that exists is per programme
or per use licensing for cable and satellite broadcasting in the US where
the attempt was made to introduce competition into licensing enforced by
decree (Einhorn, 2006).
Liebowitz and Margolis (2009) have commented on the US court decisions
on per programme licensing. They adapt economic analysis on bundling and
tie-ins to information goods such as broadcasting, pointing out that as they
are non-rival and can have zero reproduction costs there is no social benefit
from excluding users for already created works - the ‘eat all you can’ pricing
model is preferable to ‘a la carte’. Individual pricing is therefore ineﬃcient
and since the collecting societies use price discrimination in a detailed way
in setting the licence fee (for example, setting the rate according to the size
of the premises or putative number of listeners), most users’ willingness to
pay is accommodated. They argue that ‘carve-outs’ from the blanket licence
are necessarily ineﬃcient, not least because there is no eﬃcient pricing rule
for the extracted works. They also point out that bundling is normal in
many goods; a CD is a bundle of songs, a book bundles the underlying
authorial work with paper and binding.13 Though digital works can easily be
debundled and their use restricted either by DRM or by contract that does
not make individual pricing eﬃcient; moreover, the public goods features
of information goods anyway imply that scarcity pricing is economically
ineﬃcient.
13In fact most goods are bundled though we do not think of it like that. New technologies innovate
by rebundling in product and process innovation — ‘old wine in new bottles’. Digitization is not
the first technology to achieve that!
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A diﬀerent line of argument in favour of blanket licensing on equity
grounds is oﬀered by Kretschmer (2002) who pointed out some time ago
that collecting societies oﬀer solidarity to their members through collective
bargaining for the licence fee. For many individual creators that is their
best means of obtaining a reasonable reward for secondary usage. Collective
bargaining has always been particularly well established for stage and au-
diovisual performers in the UK, though not in other European countries.14
Professional associations exist in most creative areas of work and recom-
mend rates for primary work; even so few seem to be set in stone and the
individual is often forced to accept a lower rate on a ‘take it or leave it’ ba-
sis.15 Therefore, the collectively bargained remuneration for secondary use
is valued by collecting society members in addition to the fact that for most,
individual bargaining for secondary uses would be prohibitively expensive
in terms of time and transaction costs.
Thus both eﬃciency and equity arguments have been advanced in favour
of collective administration of copyright using blanket licensing and applied
to both analogue and digital technologies. The obverse is that individual
licensing is ineﬃcient.
5. Is there a case for a DCE?
What would economists want to know in order to evaluate the case for
a centralised digital copyright exchange? If assembling data were a costless
process, there would be an open and shut case on economic grounds for
14That seems to explain the greater emphasis in EU Directives on statutory remuneration for
rights such as the rental right that has to be paid to collecting societies: collective bargaining for
freelancers seems not to exist on the Continent. It is worth noting that in the UK, Equity which
represents stage, TV and film performers used to work on a repeat fee basis for TV programmes.
With the rights usually cleared for only one or two performances, the repeat fee for a greater
number of performances was based on the payment for the performance with allowance for inflation
over the intervening period. In the 1990s, Equity renegotiated its agreements on to a royalty basis,
thus reducing the upfront cost of making a programme. GEMA in Germany still uses the initial
payment rule as the basis for distributing revenues to authors and composers.
15See http://www.cippm.org.uk/symposia/symposium-2009.html.
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a centralised register of copyright works and rights holders because that
alone is likely to reduce search and information costs. But it is not. Both
the Hargreaves and Hooper reports envisage that the industries concerned
will finance it but all the net benefit calculations omit any estimate of the
set up and running costs. An oﬀ the cuﬀ figure given to this author by
one of the big collecting societies for initial set-up costs is £0.5 million —
not very much in the scheme of things: the twelve largest UK collecting
societies between them have revenues of nearly £100 million, according to
the Hargeaves Review.
Apart from the register, what does a centralised exchange for digital rights
oﬀer by way of benefits? Electronic management of rights by collecting soci-
eties has already reduced costs of licensing for right holders and users. Both
digital and ‘pre-digital’ rights can be administered with one comprehensive
licence and many users would presumably like to clear all available rights in
a work, not just the electronic ones, to save time and trouble and to avoid
risk of unauthorised use. If a rights holder preferred to debundle the dig-
ital rights in a work with the objective of maximising revenue outside the
collecting society that would increase administration costs and presumably
the price of the licence - why else would it be desirable? That would benefit
the rights holder but increase the cost to the user. In principle DRM en-
crypted in a product can handle debundling but it has so far not overcome
the problem of the lack of standardization on all platforms. DRM embodied
in a product such as a sound recording or an e-book can log use but without
standardised databases of rights holders’ contact details, cannot distribute
revenues from licence fees to rights holders. For that the databases of the
collecting societies are needed; as argued above, duplication of these would
be ineﬃcient. It is not clear how the DCE could assist with these matters
without becoming a full scale collecting society.
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Standardization of content description, rights holders details and other
data relating to copyright works are crucial to operating a DCE or hub.
Evidence to the Hargreaves and Hooper reviews show that various industry
based ‘meta’ database schemes are already underway, though experiencing
problems. Among them are the International Standard Name Identifier
(ISNI) which will produce a database of unique names of authors and per-
formers and the Global Repertoire Database (GRD) of musical works and
eventually of sound recordings. These standardized electronic listings might
enable further developments in rights management; it remains to be seen
if they then encourage individual licensing. One problem, though, is that
publishers themselves do not have all the necessary information on the works
they own (KEA, 2012). Of course, as mentioned earlier, they are only able
to include data about rights holders who choose to enter their works with
an agency or collecting society and refusal would restrict the ‘meta’ listing.
The Hargreaves Review and the Hooper study state that ‘transaction
costs’ of the existing collecting society regime are ‘very high’. Why would
they not be ‘high’ for a system topped by the DCE too? It is hard to see how
it could avoid adding yet another layer of transaction costs to those already
in place - yet without oﬀering the full bundle of services that collecting
societies provide.
6. Contestability
Hargreaves’ advocacy of the DCE is tied with the view that it would
encourage competition by putting pressure on the collecting societies to
improve their service to their members and licensees. It is argued here
that this view misunderstands the economics of natural monopolies and the
complexities of the copyright system.
Though private agencies are likely to have higher average administrative
costs than collecting societies, the view is that they could oﬀer a large rights
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT COLLECTING SOCIETIES AND DIGITAL RIGHTS 25
holder a discounted price. That undoubtedly means they would cherry-
pick top earners. What collecting societies fear most from such competition
is that default of high revenue members would leave them with smaller
rights holders for whom unit licensing costs are greater, thus imposing higher
administrative costs on the remaining members. Eventually those costs
would be passed on to licensees who might then prefer to buy a limited
bundle of works that are cheaper, setting oﬀ a downward spiral for the
collecting society. That may be good for intermediary firms in the creative
industries but it would reduce the reward and incentive to the creators
whom copyright is supposed to benefit. Yet collecting societies are often
required by their articles of government or by law to accept any and all
qualifying members however small the number and value of their works.
Those requirements would become unsupportable with cherry-picking.
So far, the development of new licensing services and individual digital
rights does not seem to have been a threat to collecting societies. There could
be several reasons for that: licensing and monitoring secondary use is too
expensive for individual creators and businesses; creators and rights holders
believe that they can get a better rate collectively than individually; a great
deal of repertoire is not in digital form; digital and ‘analogue rights are bun-
dled together; collecting societies have a track record of oﬀering a reasonable
service; and legislation requires equitable remuneration for works subject to
statutory licences to be paid to collecting societies for distribution. For one
reason or another, incumbent organisations have considerable organisational
and reputational advantages over an unknown entity in a very complex area
where mistakes could be costly to users and rights holders. Collecting so-
cieties do not compete with each other mainly because they specialise in a
particular grouping of rights determined by copyright law. There is nothing
to stop rights holders from joining foreign societies if they think they will
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get better service and some do. There have been some mergers of collecting
societies, for instance, the PRS and MCPS in the UK merged; in that case,
however, the scope of their rights and rights owners overlapped significantly
and in other countries both performance and mechanical rights were anyway
managed jointly.
Having gone through every possible argument in law and economics for
and against the development of competition in licensing services, Katz (2006)
concluded that the problem lies not in competition in the marketplace but in
the exclusive assignment of rights that collecting societies typically require
for the works they license. Furthermore, that is required by legislation in
some countries or is written into the constitution of the collecting society. In
addition, some collecting societies require assignment of the creator’s whole
repertoire, probably to save the costs of sorting through a huge bundle of
works to see which rights are included and to ensure to a licensee that the
whole lot is covered by the blanket licence. In other words, reform must
come through regulation of collecting societies not from competition.16
7. Governance of collecting societies
Space does not permit a discussion of wider issues in the governance of
collecting societies. Preliminary work by Rochelandet (2003) on the impact
of governance arrangements on the administrative eﬃciency of collecting
societies is worth noting, however. He found that the greater strength of
regulation by the state in Germany yielded a better performance in terms
of administration charges than the internal governance system in the UK
and the looser state regulation in French, comparing the similar repertoires
of the authors’ rights societies for musical performance rights. An overhaul
of the regulation of collecting societies and their governance could likely
16The conclusion reached by Einhorn (2006) in the case of per programme licences.
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achieve a considerable improvement in their services without any change to
the law or setting up new institutions.
8. Conclusion
There is a strong case for a register of copyrights, logging who owns
what and how they may be contacted. The scope of the DCE (or similar
facility) was left open by Hargreaves but the Hooper study clearly states
that the idea goes far beyond a mere central register and that the Copyright
Hub would also perform the functions of selling licences, collecting revenues
and distributing revenues to licensors, who, it is envisaged may well be
collecting societies themselves (though there is undoubtedly a sub plot to
encourage individual licensing). But it is precisely those activities that are
so ‘expensive’ (to use Hooper’s word) in existing collecting societies and the
costly job of monitoring uses and enforcing rights is nowhere mentioned.
To economists it is the bundling of all these services combined with blanket
licensing that is the basis of the natural monopoly of the collecting societies.
The natural monopoly argument predicts that splitting them up would raise
unit costs.
So far, both law and economics support the view analysed in Gallini (2011)
that the collecting societies’ monopoly is a natural monopoly that reduces
transaction costs for both rights holders and users. Belief that DRM raises
the possibility of greater flexibility in pricing and contestability seems to
have foundered with DRM itself. Moreover, if there are strong tendencies to
natural monopoly, would they not show up in a DCE that took on pricing
and licensing? There would seem to be nothing to stop the DCE becoming
a huge monopoly itself.
What shines out from all contemporary studies of copyright licensing is
that it is excessively complex and that that is because of the complexity of
copyright law itself. In some cases it is the law that inhibits markets from
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developing, not the administration of rights; the law itself is a barrier to
contestability. What needs to be decided is whether the perceived problems
of licensing are due to the inability of the law to adjust to new technologies
and uses or to the reluctance of rights owners and collecting societies to
adapt to them. Without that it is not clear what can eﬀectively be achieved
by reorganising licensing services without changes to the law and governance
practices.
What emerges from reading the evidence to the Hargreaves Review and
Hooper (2012b) is that most creative industry businesses have adapted to
the existing regime of collective licensing including that of digital rights — not
very surprising. They have made it work and there would be considerable
switching costs to changing the system (the typical reason for ‘lock-in’).
Path dependency is often the rule of human behaviour especially for risk
averse small time creators; moreover, evidence from other fields where there
is choice shows that consumers do not switch — in the UK 60 per cent of
households have not switched energy suppliers since privatisation over 20
years ago, mainly because tariﬀs are so complex that people cannot under-
stand them.17 The same argument could well apply to copyright.
What is clear is that some form of collective licensing is essential for the
working of copyright law. Copyright requires a system of charging for use
via the market and remitting rewards to creators and rights holders. Inter-
mediaries do it for primary rights and collecting societies do it for secondary
rights. It is worth remembering that the development of collecting societies
was a spontaneous market response to the problem of licensing copyright,
not (at least in the UK) the result of state intervention. New collectives
have emerged as new technologies and uses developed. So one might well
17See http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/rmr/Documents1/IpsosMori_switching_
omnibus_2011.pdf
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ask: if the case for a DCE is so strong, why it has not developed sponta-
neously? There could be two explanations for this: one, that competition
authorities have been demonstrably suspicious of any such moves that ap-
pear to strengthen the ‘monopoly hold’ of collecting societies and that has
discouraged any such moves being made privately and secondly, that the
legal situation is just too complex.
It has always been understood that natural monopolies require state reg-
ulation and for copyright this is done in several ways — by direct control
over licence fees, by oversight by a board or tribunal or court and through
competition law. It seems therefore that improved governance may achieve
more eﬃciency than contestability. Ultimately, though, copyright law has
to be reformed to make it appropriate to the digital age; it needs to be less
complex and shorter term.
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